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Abstract—Average consensus is key for distributed networks,
with applications ranging from network synchronization, dis-
tributed information fusion, decentralized control, to load balanc-
ing for parallel processors. Existing average consensus algorithms
require each node to exchange explicit state values with its
neighbors, which results in the undesirable disclosure of sensitive
state information. In this paper, we propose a novel average
consensus approach for directed graphs which can protect
the privacy of participating nodes’ initial states without the
assistance of any trusted third party or data aggregator. By
leveraging the inherent robustness of consensus dynamics to
embed privacy in random coupling weights between interacting
nodes, our proposed approach can guarantee consensus to the
exact value without any error. This is in distinct difference
from differential-privacy based average consensus approaches
which enable privacy through sacrificing accuracy in obtained
consensus value. The proposed approach is able to preserve
privacy even when multiple honest-but-curious nodes collude with
each other. Furthermore, by encrypting exchanged information,
the proposed approach can also provide privacy protection
against inference by external eavesdroppers wiretapping commu-
nication links. Numerical simulations and hardware experiments
on Raspberry Pi boards confirm that the algorithm is lightweight
in computation and communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving average consensus is an important problem in
distributed computing. For a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a connected graph, average consensus can
enable all nodes converge to the average of their initial
values through iterations based on local interaction between
neighboring nodes.
In recent years, average consensus has been extensively
studied in distributed networks. Typical applications include
load balancing (with divisible tasks) in parallel computing
[2], [3], network synchronization [4], distributed information
fusion [5], [6], and decentralized control [7], [8]. To make
all nodes converge to the average of their initial values,
conventional average consensus algorithms require each node
to exchange explicit state values with its neighbors. This
leads to the disclosure of sensitive state information, which
is undesirable in terms of privacy-preservation. In many col-
laborative applications such as smart grid, banking or health-
care networks, privacy-preservation is crucial for encouraging
participation in collaboration because individual nodes tend
not to trade privacy for performance [9]. For example, a
group of individuals using average consensus to compute a
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common opinion may want to keep secret their individual
personal opinions [10]. Another example is power systems
where multiple generators want to reach agreement on cost
while keeping their individual generation information private
[11]. Furthermore, exchanging information in the unencrypted
plaintext form is vulnerable to attackers which try to steal
information by hacking into communication links. With the
increased number of reported attack events and the growing
awareness of security, keeping data encrypted in communica-
tions has become the norm in many applications, particularly
in many real-time sensing and control systems such as power
systems and wireless sensor networks.
To enable privacy-preservation in average consensus, some
results have been reported. One commonly used approach
is differential privacy from the database literature [12]–
[16]. However, differential-privacy based approaches do not
guarantee the exact average value due to their fundamental
trade-off between enabled privacy and computational accuracy
[15], [17]. To guarantee computational accuracy, which is
extremely important in sensor networks and cyber-physical
systems, [18]–[21] proposed to inject additive correlated noise
to exchanged messages, instead of uncorrelated noise used by
differential-privacy. Observability based approaches have also
been discussed to protect the privacy of multi-agent networks.
The basic idea is to design the interaction topology so as to
minimize the observability from a compromised agent, which
amounts to minimizing its ability to infer the initial states of
other network agents [22], [23]. However, observability based
approaches cannot protect the privacy of the direct neighbors
of the compromised agent. Moreover, both the correlated-noise
based and the observability based approaches are vulnerable to
external eavesdroppers who can steal exchanged information
by hacking into the communication channels [21]. Recently,
the authors in [24] proposed a new privacy-preserving ap-
proach to improving resilience to external eavesdroppers by
encoding privacy in random coupling weights with the as-
sistance of additive homomorphic encryption. However, all
the aforementioned approaches require undirected or directed
but balanced interactions and none of them are applicable to
directed (potentially unbalanced) graphs due to the difficulties
in constructing doubly stochastic weight matrices. It is worth
noting that the approaches in [25] and [26] for constructing
doubly stochastic weight matrices require each node to ex-
plicitly send and reveal its weight and state to neighboring
nodes, and hence are inapplicable when privacy preservation
is required.
In this paper, we address privacy-preserving average con-
sensus under directed graphs that are not necessarily balanced.
Building on the conventional push-sum based consensus algo-
rithm, we enable privacy preservation by judiciously adding
2randomness in coupling weights and leverage the inherent
robustness of push-sum to ensure consensus to the accurate
value. The approach can also be easily extended to provide
privacy protection against external eavesdroppers through in-
corporating partially homomorphic encryption. Both numerical
simulations and hardware experiments are provided to verify
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces some preliminaries of graph theory,
the conventional push-sum algorithm, and the Paillier cryp-
tosystem.
A. Graph Theory
Consider a network of N nodes which is represented by a
directed graph G = (V , E) with node set V = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges, whose elements are such
that (i, j) ∈ E holds if and only if there exists a directed
communication link from node j to node i, i.e., node j can
send messages to node i. For notional convenience, we assume
no self edges, i.e., (i, i) /∈ E for all i ∈ V . Each edge (i, j) has
an associated weight, pij > 0. The out-neighbor set of node
i, which represents the set of nodes that can receive messages
from node i, is denoted as N outi = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E}.
Similarly, the in-neighbor set of node i, which represents the
set of nodes that can send messages to node i, is denoted as
N ini = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}. From the definitions, it can be
obtained that i ∈ N outj and j ∈ N ini are equivalent to each
other. Node i’s out-degree is denoted as Douti = |N outi | and
its in-degree is denoted as Dini = |N ini |, where |S| denotes
the cardinality of set S. In this paper, we focus on strongly
connected graphs which are defined as follows:
Definition 1: A directed graph G is strongly connected if
for any i, j ∈ V with i 6= j, there exists at least one directed
path from i to j in G, where the directed path respects the
direction of the edges.
B. The Conventional Push-Sum Algorithm
Push-sum was introduced in [27] and [28] to achieve
average consensus for nodes interacting on a directed graph
that is not necessarily balanced (a balanced graph is a graph
that satisfies
∑
j∈N in
i
pij =
∑
j∈Nout
i
pji for all i). In the
conventional push-sum, N nodes interact on a directed graph,
with each node having an initial state x0i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ).
Denote the average of all initial states as α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N .
The push-sum algorithm performs two iterative computations
in parallel, and allows each node to asymptotically obtain the
exact average of the initial values α. The mechanism of the
conventional push-sum algorithm is described as follows:
Algorithm 0: Conventional push-sum algorithm
1) Each node i initializes si(0) = x
0
i , wi(0) = 1, and
pii(0) = si(0)/wi(0). The coupling weight pij associated
with edge (i, j) satisfies pij ∈ (0, 1) if j ∈ N ini ∪
{i} holds and pij = 0 otherwise. pij also satisfies∑N
i=1 pij = 1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
2) At iteration k:
a) Node i computes pjisi(k) and pjiwi(k), and sends
them to its out-neighbors j ∈ N outi .
b) After receiving pijsj(k) and pijwj(k) from its in-
neighbors j ∈ N ini , node i updates si and wi as
follows: 

si(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
pijsj(k)
wi(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
pijwj(k)
(1)
c) Node i computes the estimate as pii(k + 1) = si(k +
1)/wi(k + 1).
For the sake of notational simplicity, the update rule in (1)
can be rewritten in a more compact form as follows:{
s(k + 1) = Ps(k)
w(k + 1) = Pw(k)
(2)
where s(k) = [s1(k), s2(k), . . . , sN(k)]
T and w(k) =
[w1(k), w2(k), . . . , wN (k)]
T , and P = [pij ] with pij defined
in step 1) of Algorithm 0. According to Algorithm 0, we have
s(0) = [x01, x
0
2, . . . , x
0
N ]
T and w(0) = 1. It is also easy to
obtain that matrix P is column stochastic since its column
sums are equal to one, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 pij = 1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
At iteration k, each node calculates the ratio pii(k + 1) =
si(k + 1)/wi(k + 1), which is used to estimate the average
value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N . Since the directed graph G is assumed
to be strongly connected, Pk converges to a rank-1 matrix
exponentially fast [29], [30]. Defining P∞ as the limit of Pk
when k → ∞, we have that P∞ is of the form P∞ = v1T
where v = [v1, v2, . . . , vN ]
T . Making use of the facts s(k) =
P
k
s(0) and w(k) = Pkw(0), we have
pii(∞) = si(∞)
wi(∞) =
[P∞s(0)]i
[P∞w(0)]i
=
vi
∑N
j=1 sj(0)
vi
∑N
j=1 wj(0)
=
∑N
j=1 x
0
j
N
= α
(3)
where [P∞s(0)]i and [P
∞
w(0)]i represent the i-th element
of vectors P∞s(0) and P∞w(0), respectively. Therefore, all
estimates pi1(k), pi2(k), . . . , piN (k) asymptotically converge to
the average value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N .
C. Paillier Cryptosystem
Our method to protect privacy against external eavesdrop-
pers wiretapping communication links is to encrypt exchanged
messages. To this end, we combine Paillier cryptosystem
[31] with consensus dynamics. The Paillier cryptosystem is
a public-key cryptosystem which employs a pair of keys: a
public key and a private key (also called secret key). The
public key is distributed publicly and can be used by any
person to encrypt a message, but such a message can only
be decrypted by the private key. Since Paillier cryptosystem
does not need the assistance of a trusted third party for key
management, it is applicable in open and dynamic networks.
3The Paillier cryptosystem includes three algorithms as fol-
lows:
Paillier cryptosystem
Key generation:
1) Choose two large prime numbers p and q of equal bit-
length and compute n = pq.
2) Let g = n+ 1.
3) Let λ = φ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1), where φ(·) is the Euler’s
totient function.
4) Let µ = φ(n)−1 mod n which is the modular multi-
plicative inverse of φ(n).
5) The public key kp for encryption is (n, g).
6) The private key ks for decryption is (λ, µ).
Encryption (c = E(m)):
Recall the definitions of Zn = {z | z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n} and
Z
∗
n = {z | z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n, gcd(z, n) = 1} where gcd(a, b)
is the greatest common divisor of a and b.
1) Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n.
2) The ciphertext is given by c = gm · rn mod n2, where
m ∈ Zn, c ∈ Z∗n2 .
Decryption (m = D(c)):
1) Define the integer division function L(µ) = µ−1n .
2) The plaintext is m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
III. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING ALGORITHM AND
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show that the conventional push-sum
algorithm does not preserve privacy, and then we propose our
privacy-preserving average consensus algorithm for directed
graphs. To this end, we first introduce the attack model and
the definition of privacy.
Definition 2: An honest-but-curious adversary is a node who
follows all protocol steps correctly but is curious and collects
received data in an attempt to learn the initial value of other
participating nodes.
Definition 3: For a distributed network of N nodes, the
privacy of initial value x0i of node i is preserved if x
0
i cannot be
estimated by honest-but-curious adversaries with any accuracy.
Definition 3 requires that honest-but-curious adversaries
cannot even find a range for a private value and thus is
more stringent than the privacy definition considered in [32]–
[34] which defines privacy preservation as the inability of an
adversary to uniquely determine the protected value. It is worth
noting that by a finite range, we mean lower and upper bounds
that an adversary may obtain based on accessible information.
We do not consider representation bounds caused by the finite
number of bytes that can be used to represent a number in a
computer.
We first show that the conventional push-sum algorithm is
not privacy-preserving. According to (1) and (2), an honest-
but-curious node i will receive two messages pijsj(0) and
pijwj(0) from its in-neighbor node j ∈ N ini after the first
iteration k = 0. Then node i can uniquely determine the initial
value x0j by x
0
j = sj(0) =
pijsj(0)
pijwj(0)
using the fact wj(0) = 1.
So an honest-but-curious node can infer the initial values of
all its in-neighbors, meaning that the conventional push-sum
algorithm cannot provide protection against honest-but-curious
attackers.
A. Privacy-Preserving Average Consensus Algorithm
The above analysis shows that using the same coupling
weight pij for both pijsj(0) and pijwj(0) leads to the disclo-
sure of the initial state value. Motivated by this observation,
we introduce a novel privacy-preserving average consensus
algorithm that uses different time-varying coupling weights
for si and wi for iterations k = 0, . . . ,K , where K can be
any non-negative integer.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving average consensus algorithm
1) Positive integerK and parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) are known to
every node. Each node i initializes si(0) = x
0
i , wi(0) =
1, and pii(0) = si(0)/wi(0).
2) At iteration k:
a) If k ≤ K , node i generates one set of random
coupling weights
{
psji(k) ∈ R
∣∣ j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}}
with the sum of this set equal to 1, and assigns
pwii(k) = 1 and p
w
ji(k) = 0 for j ∈ N outi ; otherwise,
node i generates one set of random coupling weights{
psji(k) ∈ (ε, 1)
∣∣ j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}} satisfying the
sum 1 condition, and assigns pwji(k) = p
s
ji(k) for
j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}. For j /∈ N outi ∪ {i}, node i always
sets psji(k) and p
w
ji(k) to 0.
b) Node i computes psji(k)si(k) and p
w
ji(k)wi(k) for j ∈
N outi , and sends them to node j.
c) After receiving psij(k)sj(k) and p
w
ij(k)wj(k) from its
in-neighbors j ∈ N ini , node i updates si and wi in the
following way

si(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
psij(k)sj(k)
wi(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
pwij(k)wj(k)
(4)
d) Node i computes the estimate as pii(k + 1) = si(k +
1)/wi(k + 1).
Following Algorithm 1, the dynamics in (4) can be summa-
rized as follows:{
s(k + 1) = Ps(k)s(k)
w(k + 1) = Pw(k)w(k)
(5)
where s(k) = [s1(k), s2(k), . . . , sN(k)]
T and w(k) =
[w1(k), w2(k), . . . , wN (k)]
T , and the ij-th entries of Ps(k)
and Pw(k) are the coupling weights p
s
ij(k) and p
w
ij(k),
respectively. For the initial iteration, we have s(0) =
[x01, x
0
2, . . . , x
0
N ]
T and w(0) = 1. Under Algorithm 1, we
have that Ps(k) and Pw(k) in (5) are time-varying, column
stochastic, and satisfy Ps(k) 6= Pw(k) for k ≤ K and
Ps(k) = Pw(k) for k ≥ K + 1. Note that Pw(k) = I holds
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K .
4Define transition matrices as follows{
Φs(k : t) = Ps(k) · · ·Ps(t)
Φw(k : t) = Pw(k) · · ·Pw(t)
(6)
for all k and t with k ≥ t, where Φs(k : k) = Ps(k) and
Φw(k : k) = Pw(k). Then the system dynamics in (5) can be
rewritten as:{
s(K + 1) = Φs(K : 0)s(0)
w(K + 1) = Φw(K : 0)w(0) = 1
(7)
and {
s(k + 1) = Φs(k : K + 1)s(K + 1)
w(k + 1) = Φw(k : K + 1)w(K + 1)
(8)
for k ≥ K + 1. In (7) we used the facts w(0) = 1 and
Φw(K : 0) = I (note that Pw(k) = I for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K).
B. Convergence Analysis
Next we show that Algorithm 1 can guarantee convergence
to the exact average value of all initial values. We will also
analyze the convergence rate of Algorithm 1. Following the
the convergence definition in [35] and [36], we define the
convergence rate to be at least γ ∈ (0, 1) if there exists a
positive constant C such that
∥∥pi(k)−α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk holds for all
k, where pi(k) = [pi1(k), . . . , piN (k)]
T and α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N
is the average value. Note that a smaller γ means a faster con-
vergence. Before analyzing the convergence rate of Algorithm
1, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under
Algorithm 1, each node i has wi(k) = 1 for k ≤ K + 1 and
wi(k) ≥ εN for k ≥ K + 2.
Proof: The proof is given in the Appendix. 
Theorem 1: Consider a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under
Algorithm 1, the estimate pii(k) = si(k)/wi(k) of each node
i will converge to the average value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N . More
specifically, the convergence rate of Algorithm 1 is at least
γ = (1 − εN−1) 1N−1 ∈ (0, 1), meaning that there exists a
positive constant C such that
∥∥pi(k)− α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk holds for
all k.
Proof: Combining w(K+1) = 1 in (7) with (8), we obtain{
s(K + l + 1) = Φs(K + l : K + 1)s(K + 1)
w(K + l + 1) = Φw(K + l : K + 1)1
(9)
for l ≥ 1. Since for k ≥ K + 1, Ps(k) satisfies the Assump-
tions 2, 3(a), 4, and 5 in [37], according to its Proposition
1(b), the transition matrix Φs(K + l : K + 1) converges to a
stochastic vector ϕ(K + l) with a geometric rate with respect
to i and j, i.e., for all i, j = 1, . . . , N and l ≥ 1∣∣∣[Φs(K + l : K + 1)]ij − ϕi(K + l)∣∣∣ ≤ C0γl−1 (10)
holds with C0 = 2(1 + ε
−N+1)/(1− εN−1) and γ = (1 −
εN−1)
1
N−1 . Defining M(K + l : K + 1) as
M(K + l : K + 1) , Φs(K + l : K + 1)−ϕ(K + l)1T
(11)
we have ∣∣∣[M(K + l : K + 1)]ij ∣∣∣ ≤ C0γl−1 (12)
for all i, j = 1, . . . , N and l ≥ 1.
Given Ps(k) = Pw(k) for k ≥ K+1, Φs(K+l : K+1) =
Φw(K + l : K + 1) holds for l ≥ 1. Further combining (11)
with (9) leads to

s(K + l + 1) =M(K + l : K + 1)s(K + 1)
+ ϕ(K + l)1T s(K + 1)
w(K + l + 1) =M(K + l : K + 1)1+Nϕ(K + l)
(13)
Note that Φs(K : 0) is column stochastic since Ps(k) is
column stochastic. So from (7), we have a mass conservation
property for s(k) as follows:
1
T
s(K + 1) = 1TΦs(K : 0)s(0) = 1
T
s(0) (14)
which further leads to
α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j
N
=
1
T
s(0)
N
=
1
T
s(K + 1)
N
(15)
Combining (13) with (15), we have
pii(K + l+ 1)− α
=
si(K + l + 1)
wi(K + l+ 1)
− 1
T
s(K + 1)
N
=
si(K + l + 1)
wi(K + l+ 1)
− 1
T
s(K + 1)wi(K + l+ 1)
Nwi(K + l + 1)
=
[M(K + l : K + 1)s(K + 1)]i + ϕi(K + l)1
T
s(K + 1)
wi(K + l + 1)
− 1
T
s(K + 1)
(
[M(K + l : K + 1)1]i +Nϕi(K + l)
)
Nwi(K + l + 1)
=
[M(K + l : K + 1)s(K + 1)]i
wi(K + l + 1)
− 1
T
s(K + 1)[M(K + l : K + 1)1]i
Nwi(K + l + 1)
(16)
Therefore, for i = 1, . . . , N and l ≥ 1, one can obtain∣∣pii(K + l+ 1)− α∣∣
≤
∣∣[M(K + l : K + 1)s(K + 1)]i∣∣
wi(K + l + 1)
+
∣∣1T s(K + 1)[M(K + l : K + 1)1]i∣∣
Nwi(K + l + 1)
≤ 1
εN
(
max
j
∣∣[M(K + l : K + 1)]ij∣∣)∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥1
+
1
εN
∣∣1T s(K + 1)∣∣(max
j
∣∣[M(K + l : K + 1)]ij∣∣)
(17)
where we used wi(K + l + 1) ≥ εN from Lemma 1 in
the derivation. Further taking into account the relationship∣∣1T s(K + 1)∣∣ ≤ ∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥
1
and (12), we have∣∣pii(K + l + 1)− α∣∣ ≤ 2C0∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥1ε−Nγl−1 (18)
for l ≥ 1.
5From (18), we obtain for l ≥ 1∥∥pi(K + l+ 1)− α1∥∥ ≤ 2√NC0∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥1ε−Nγl−1
= C1γ
K+l+1
(19)
where C1 is given by
C1 = 2
√
NC0
∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥
1
ε−Nγ−K−2 (20)
Therefore, we have
∥∥pi(k)− α1∥∥ ≤ C1γk for k ≥ K + 2.
For k ≤ K + 1, given wi(k) = 1 and 1T s(k) = 1T s(0),
one can easily obtain
pii(k)− α = si(k)
wi(k)
− 1
T
s(k)
N
= si(k)−
N∑
j=1
sj(k)/N
(21)
Thus, it follows for k ≤ K + 1
∥∥pi(k)− α1∥∥ = ( N∑
i=1
(
si(k)−
N∑
j=1
sj(k)/N
)2)1/2
=
( N∑
i=1
(
si(k)
)2 − ( N∑
j=1
sj(k)
)2
/N
)1/2
≤ ∥∥s(k)∥∥
(22)
Defining C as
C , max
{
C1,
∥∥s(0)∥∥, γ−1∥∥s(1)∥∥, . . . , γ−K−1∥∥s(K + 1)∥∥}
(23)
we have ∥∥pi(k)− α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk (24)
for all k. Therefore, each node i will converge to the average
value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N with convergence rate at least γ =
(1− εN−1) 1N−1 ∈ (0, 1). 
From Theorem 1, it can be seen that a smaller γ leads to a
faster convergence. Given the relationship γ = (1−εN−1) 1N−1 ,
to get a faster convergence speed, i.e., a smaller γ, it suffices
to increase ε, which amounts to reducing the size of the range
(ε, 1) for the random selection of coupling weights psji(k) and
pwji(k) with k ≥ K +1. Note that although the reduced range
(ε, 1) enables an honest-but-curious node to get a better range
estimation of node i’s intermediate states si(k) and wi(k) for
k ≥ K+1 from psji(k)si(k) and pwji(k)wi(k), it does not affect
the privacy protection of node i’s initial state x0i , as will be
shown in our privacy analysis in the following subsection. It
is also worth noting that to satisfy the requirements of random
weights selection in Algorithm 1, ε cannot be arbitrarily close
to 1. In fact, ε must satisfy ε < 1/(maxiD
out
i + 1).
C. Privacy-Preserving Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we rigorously prove that Algorithm 1 is
able to achieve the privacy defined in Definition 3. We consider
two different scenarios: 1) a single adversary acting on its own
(i.e., without collusion with other adversaries) and 2) multiple
adversaries colluding with each other.
1) Single honest-but-curious node case: In this situation,
we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: We assume that there are 1 ≤ Q ≤ N
honest-but-curious nodes which try to infer node i’s initial
value without sharing information with each other.
Theorem 2: Consider a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under
Assumption 1, Algorithm 1 can preserve the privacy of node
i if |N outi ∪ N ini | ≥ 2 holds.
Proof: To show that the privacy of node i can be preserved,
we have to show that the privacy of the initial value x0i of node
i can be preserved against any honest-but-curious node j, i.e.,
node j cannot estimate the value of x0i with any accuracy.
Our idea is based on the indistinguishability of x0i ’s arbitrary
variation to node j. According to Algorithm 1 and Assumption
1, all the information accessible to node j, denoted as Ij , are
given as follows:
Ij =
{Istatej (k) ∪ Isendj (k) ∪ I receivej (k) ∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . .}
∪ {wm(k) = 1 ∣∣m ∈ V , k = 0, 1, . . . ,K + 1} (25)
where
Istatej (k) =
{
sj(k), wj(k)
}
Isendj (k) =
{
psmj(k)sj(k), p
w
mj(k)wj(k) | m ∈ N outj ∪ {j}
}
I receivej (k) =
{
psjn(k)sn(k), p
w
jn(k)wn(k) | n ∈ N inj
}
(26)
represent the respective state information, sent information,
and received information of node j at iteration k.
The only information available to node j to infer x0i is Ij .
So if we can show that under any initial value x˜0i 6= x0i , the
information accessible to node j, i.e., I˜j , could be exactly the
same as Ij in (25) and (26), then node j has no way to even
find a range for the initial value x0i . Therefore, we only need
to prove that for any x˜0i 6= x0i , I˜j = Ij could hold.
Under the condition |N outi ∪ N ini | ≥ 2, there must exist a
node l ∈ N outi ∪N ini such that l 6= j holds. Next we show that
there exist initial values of x0l and coupling weights satisfying
the requirements in Algorithm 1 that make I˜j = Ij hold for
any x˜0i 6= x0i . More specifically, under the initial condition
x˜0l = x
0
i + x
0
l − x˜0i , we consider two cases, l ∈ N outi and
l ∈ N ini , respectively (note that if l ∈ N outi ∩N ini holds, either
case can be used in the argument to draw a same conclusion):
Case I: If l ∈ N outi holds, we can easily obtain I˜j = Ij for
any x˜0i 6= x0i under the following coupling weights

p˜smn(0) = p
s
mn(0) ∀m ∈ V , n ∈ V \ {i, l}
p˜smi(0) = p
s
mi(0)x
0
i /x˜
0
i ∀m ∈ V \ {l}
p˜sli(0) = (p
s
li(0)x
0
i + x˜
0
i − x0i )/x˜0i
p˜sml(0) = p
s
ml(0)x
0
l /(x
0
i + x
0
l − x˜0i ) ∀m ∈ V \ {l}
p˜sll(0) = (p
s
ll(0)x
0
l − x˜0i + x0i )/(x0i + x0l − x˜0i )
p˜smn(k) = p
s
mn(k) ∀m,n ∈ V , k = 1, 2, . . .
p˜wmn(k) = p
w
mn(k) ∀m,n ∈ V , k = 0, 1, . . .
(27)
where “\” represents set subtraction.
Case II: If l ∈ N ini holds, it can be easily verified that
I˜j = Ij is true for any x˜0i 6= x0i under the following coupling
weights
6

p˜smn(0) = p
s
mn(0) ∀m ∈ V , n ∈ V \ {i, l}
p˜smi(0) = p
s
mi(0)x
0
i /x˜
0
i ∀m ∈ V \ {i}
p˜sii(0) = (p
s
ii(0)x
0
i + x˜
0
i − x0i )/x˜0i
p˜sml(0) = p
s
ml(0)x
0
l /(x
0
i + x
0
l − x˜0i ) ∀m ∈ V \ {i}
p˜sil(0) = (p
s
il(0)x
0
l − x˜0i + x0i )/(x0i + x0l − x˜0i )
p˜smn(k) = p
s
mn(k) ∀m,n ∈ V , k = 1, 2, . . .
p˜wmn(k) = p
w
mn(k) ∀m,n ∈ V , k = 0, 1, . . .
(28)
Summarizing cases I and II, we have I˜j = Ij for any
x˜0i 6= x0i , which means that node j cannot estimate the value
of x0i with any accuracy based on its accessible information.
Therefore, under Algorithm 1 and Assumption 1, the privacy
of node i can be preserved if |N outi ∪N ini | ≥ 2 holds. 
Next we show that if the conditions in Theorem 2 cannot
be met, then the privacy of node i can be breached.
Theorem 3: Consider a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under
Algorithm 1 and Assumption 1, the privacy of node i cannot
be preserved against node j if node j is the only in-neighbor
and out-neighbor of node i, i.e., N outi = N ini = {j}. In fact,
under N outi = N ini = {j}, the initial value x0i of node i can
be uniquely determined by node j.
Proof: Since N outi = N ini = {j} holds, one can get the
dynamics of si and wi from (4) as follows:{
si(k + 1) = p
s
ii(k)si(k) + p
s
ij(k)sj(k)
wi(k + 1) = p
w
ii(k)wi(k) + p
w
ij(k)wj(k)
(29)
Under the requirements of coupling weights in Algorithm 1,
we have psii(k) + p
s
ji(k) = 1 and p
w
ii(k) + p
w
ji(k) = 1. So it
follows {
si(k) = p
s
ii(k)si(k) + p
s
ji(k)si(k)
wi(k) = p
w
ii(k)wi(k) + p
w
ji(k)wi(k)
(30)
Combining (29) and (30) leads to{
si(k + 1)− si(k) = psij(k)sj(k)− psji(k)si(k)
wi(k + 1)− wi(k) = pwij(k)wj(k)− pwji(k)wi(k)
(31)
and further

si(k)− si(0) =
k−1∑
l=0
[
psij(l)sj(l)− psji(l)si(l)
]
wi(k)− wi(0) =
k−1∑
l=0
[
pwij(l)wj(l)− pwji(l)wi(l)
] (32)
Note that the right-hand side of (32) is accessible to the honest-
but-curious node j because psij(l)sj(l) and p
w
ij(l)wj(l) are
computed and sent by node j, and psji(l)si(l) and p
w
ji(l)wi(l)
are received by node j. Further taking into consideration
wi(0) = 1, node j can infer wi(k) for all k. Given p
s
ji(k) =
pwji(k) for k ≥ K + 1, node j can also infer si(k) below for
k ≥ K + 1.
si(k) =
psji(k)si(k)
pwji(k)wi(k)
wi(k) (33)
Therefore, we have that node j can uniquely infer x0i = si(0)
based on (32). 
2) Multiple honest-but-curious nodes colluding with each
other: In this situation, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2: We assume that a set of honest-but-curious
nodes A share information with each other to infer the initial
value x0i of node i /∈ A.
Theorem 4: Consider a network of N nodes interacting on a
strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under Algorithm 1 and
Assumption 2, the privacy of node i can be preserved against
the set of honest-but-curious nodes A if (N outi ∪ N ini ) 6⊂
A holds, i.e., there exits at least one node that belongs to
N outi ∪ N ini but not A.
Proof: To show that the privacy of node i can be preserved,
we have to show that no honest-but-curious node j ∈ A can
estimate the value of x0i with any accuracy. According to
Assumption 2, each node in A has access to the information
accessible to any node in A. So we represent the accessible
information as
IA =
{Ij ∣∣ j ∈ A} (34)
where Ij is given by (25). Following the same line of
reasoning in Theorem 2, to prove that node j ∈ A cannot
estimate the value of x0i with any accuracy, it suffices to prove
that for any x˜0i 6= x0i , the information accessible to node j,
i.e., I˜A, could be exactly the same as IA.
If (N outi ∪ N ini ) 6⊂ A is true, then there must exist a node
l ∈ N outi ∪N ini such that l /∈ A holds. It can be easily verified
that under the initial condition x˜0l = x
0
i + x
0
l − x˜0i , there exist
respective coupling weights in (27) and (28) for l ∈ N outi
and l ∈ N ini that satisfy the requirements in Algorithm 1 and
make I˜A = IA hold under any x˜0i 6= x0i .
Thus, we can have I˜A = IA for any x˜0i 6= x0i , meaning that
node j ∈ A cannot estimate the value of x0i with any accuracy
even based on the information accessible to the entire set A.
Therefore, under Algorithm 1 and Assumption 2, the privacy
of node i can be preserved against the set of honest-but-curious
nodes A if (N outi ∪ N ini ) 6⊂ A holds. 
Next we show that if the conditions in Theorem 4 cannot
be met, then the privacy of node i can be breached.
Theorem 5: Consider a distributed network of N nodes
interacting on a strongly connected graph G = (V , E). Under
Algorithm 1 and Assumption 2, the privacy of node i cannot be
preserved when all the in-neighbors and out-neighbors belong
to A, i.e., (N outi ∪N ini ) ⊂ A. In fact, when (N outi ∪N ini ) ⊂ A
is true, the initial value x0i of node i can be uniquely deter-
mined by honest-but-curious nodes j ∈ A.
Proof: From (4), we have the dynamics of si and wi as
follows:


si(k + 1) =
∑
n∈N in
i
psin(k)sn(k) + p
s
ii(k)si(k)
wi(k + 1) =
∑
n∈N in
i
pwin(k)wn(k) + p
w
ii(k)wi(k)
(35)
Under the requirements of coupling weights in Algorithm
1, we have psii(k) +
∑
m∈Nout
i
psmi(k) = 1 and p
w
ii(k) +
7∑
m∈Nout
i
pwmi(k) = 1. Plugging these equations into (35),
we can obtain

si(k + 1)− si(k) =∑
n∈N in
i
psin(k)sn(k)−
∑
m∈Nout
i
psmi(k)si(k)
wi(k + 1)− wi(k) =∑
n∈N in
i
pwin(k)wn(k)−
∑
m∈Nout
i
pwmi(k)wi(k)
(36)
and further

si(k)− si(0) =
k−1∑
l=0
[ ∑
n∈N in
i
psin(l)sn(l)−
∑
m∈Nout
i
psmi(l)si(l)
]
wi(k)− wi(0) =
k−1∑
l=0
[ ∑
n∈N in
i
pwin(l)wn(l)−
∑
m∈Nout
i
pwmi(l)wi(l)
]
(37)
Note that under Assumption 2, each honest-but-curious node
j ∈ A has access to the information IA in (34). If (N outi ∪
N ini ) ⊂ A is true, then all terms in the right-hand side of (37)
belong to IA, and hence are accessible to every node j ∈ A.
By further taking into consideration wi(0) = 1, node j can
uniquely infer wi(k) for all k.
Given psli(k) = p
w
li(k) for l ∈ N outi ⊂ A and k ≥ K + 1,
each node j ∈ A can infer si(k) for k ≥ K + 1 by using the
following relationship
si(k) =
psli(k)si(k)
pwli(k)wi(k)
wi(k) for k ≥ K + 1 (38)
Note that psli(k)si(k) and p
w
li(k)wi(k) are known to node j
since l ∈ A holds. Further making use of (37), each node
j ∈ A can uniquely determine the value of x0i = si(0). 
Remark 1: Theorems 4 and 5 are obtained under Assump-
tion 2 that honest-but-curious nodes in set A collude with each
other. If there are more than one set of honest-but-curious
nodes in a network and these sets do not collude with each
other, then following a similar argument as in Theorems 4 and
5, we can prove that the privacy of node i can be preserved
if N outi ∪N ini is not included in any set of colluding honest-
but-curious nodes.
Remark 2: From the above analysis, we know that besides
the given topology conditions, introducing Ps(k) 6= Pw(k)
for k ≤ K is key to protect privacy against honest-but-
curious nodes. However, making Ps(k) 6= Pw(k) delays the
convergence and hence leads to a trade-off between privacy
preservation and convergence speed. This is confirmed in our
numerical simulations in Fig. 2 which showed that conver-
gence only initiated after k = K + 1.
Remark 3: If an adversary can obtain side information, then
a larger K protects the privacy of more intermediate states
si(k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K . This is because for k ≥ K + 1, pi(k)
can be easily obtained by an adversary due to Ps(k) = Pw(k)
for k ≥ K+1, which makes states si(k) for k ≥ K+1 easier
to infer through si(k) = pi(k)wi(k) if side information about
wi(k) is available. Therefore, although a smaller K leads to
a faster convergence, as discussed in Remark 2, a larger K
can protect more intermediate states (si(k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K)
when an adversary can obtain side information. Since our
paper focuses on the privacy preservation of the initial state
x0i = si(0), we can set K to be any non-negative integer.
IV. EXTENDED PRIVACY-PRESERVING AVERAGE
CONSENSUS AGAINST EAVESDROPPERS
It is well known that exchanging information in the un-
encrypted plaintext form is vulnerable to eavesdroppers who
steal information by wiretapping communication links. So in
this section, we extend our proposed Algorithm 1 to provide
protection against eavesdroppers by employing partially ho-
momorphic encryption. To this end, we first introduce the
definition of eavesdroppers as follows.
Definition 4: An eavesdropper is an external attacker who
knows the network interaction dynamics and topology, and
is able to wiretap all communication links and intercept all
exchanged messages.
Generally speaking, an eavesdropper is more disruptive than
an honest-but-curious node in terms of information breaches
because it can access all messages exchanged in the network
whereas the latter can only access the messages destined to
it. However, an honest-but-curious node does have one piece
of information that is unknown to an external eavesdropper,
i.e., the honest-but-curious node i has access to its internal
initial value x0i . It is also worth noting that existing correlated-
noise based privacy-preserving average consensus approaches
in [18]–[21] fail to provide protection against eavesdroppers
modeled in this paper.
To preserve privacy against eavesdroppers, we employ the
Paillier cryptosystem in Section II-C to encrypt exchanged
messages. So each node i needs to generate its public key
kpi = (hi, gi) and private key k
s
i = (λi, µi) before the
iterative consensus starts. It is worth noting that under the
partially homomorphic cryptography framework, every node
can have access to every other nodes’ public key (using e.g.,
flooding [38]) without the assistance of any third party or data
aggregator, even when the communication links are directed.
This is in disparate difference from commonly used encryption
schemes which rely on either bi-directional communications
or a trusted third party to manage keys [39].
Algorithm 2: Extended privacy-preserving average consensus
algorithm against eavesdroppers
1) Positive integer K and parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) are known
to every node. Each node i generates a public key kpi =
(hi, gi) and a private key k
s
i = (λi, µi), and initializes
si(0) = x
0
i , wi(0) = 1, and pii(0) = si(0)/wi(0).
2) At iteration k,
a) If k ≤ K , node i generates one set of random
coupling weights
{
psji(k) ∈ R
∣∣ j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}}
with the sum of this set equal to 1, and assigns
pwii(k) = 1 and p
w
ji(k) = 0 for j ∈ N outi ; otherwise,
node i generates one set of random coupling weights{
psji(k) ∈ (ε, 1)
∣∣ j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}} satisfying the
8sum 1 condition, and assigns pwji(k) = p
s
ji(k) for
j ∈ N outi ∪ {i}.
b) Node i computes psji(k)si(k) and p
w
ji(k)wi(k) for j ∈
N outi , uses the public key kpj of node j to encrypt these
values, and sends them to node j.
c) After receiving the encrypted messages psij(k)sj(k)
and pwij(k)wj(k) from its in-neighbors j ∈ N ini , node
i uses its private key ksi to decrypt them, and updates
si and wi as follows:

si(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
psij(k)sj(k)
wi(k + 1) =
∑
j∈N in
i
∪{i}
pwij(k)wj(k)
(39)
d) Node i computes the estimate as pii(k + 1) = si(k +
1)/wi(k + 1).
V. RESULTS VALIDATION
We used both numerical simulations and hardware experi-
ments to verify the effectiveness of our proposed approach.
A. Numerical Simulations
We first evaluated the convergence performance of our
proposed Algorithm 1. In this simulation, we considered a
network of N = 5 nodes interacting on a strongly connected
graph, which is shown in Fig. 1. ε was set to 0.01. For
iterations k ≤ K , following the requirements of Algorithm 1,
the coupling weights psij(k) for j ∈ N outi ∪ {i} were chosen
from (−10, 10). The initial values x0i for i = 1, . . . , N were
randomly chosen from (0, 50). We used e(k) to measure the
error between the estimate pii(k) = si(k)/wi(k) and the true
average value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N at iteration k, i.e.,
e(k) =
∥∥pi(k)− α1∥∥ = ( N∑
i=1
(pii(k)− α)2
)1/2
(40)
Three experiments were conducted with K being set to 1, 5,
and 9, respectively. The evolution of e(k) is shown in Fig. 2.
It can be seen that e(k) approached to 0, meaning that every
node converged to the average value α =
∑N
j=1 x
0
j/N . It is
also worth noting that from Fig. 2, we can see that Algorithm
1 did not start to converge until iteration step k ≥ K + 1,
which confirmed our analysis in Remark 2.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a strongly connected graph with 5 nodes.
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Fig. 2. The evolution of error e(k) under different K for a network of 5
nodes.
We then evaluated the privacy-preserving performance of
Algorithm 1. Under the same network setup as in the previous
simulation, we considered the case where a set of honest-but-
curious nodes 2, 3, and 4 colluded to infer the initial value
x01 of node 1. So we have A = {2, 3, 4}. Note that N out1 ∪
N in1 = {2, 4, 5} 6⊂ A holds for node 1. Two experiments
were conducted with x01 being set to 40 and −40, respectively.
x02, . . . , x
0
5 were randomly chosen from (0, 50). K was set to
1. The other parameters were the same as the first simulation,
and the maximal iteration step was M = 100. To infer the
value of x01, the nodes in set A were able to construct the
following linear equations based on the accessible information
IA
s1(k + 1)− s1(k) + ∆s1(k) = ps14(k)s4(k)− ps21(k)s1(k)
(41)
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,M and
w1(k + 1)− w1(k) + ∆w1(k) = pw14(k)w4(k)− pw21(k)w1(k)
(42)
for k = K + 1, . . . ,M where ∆s1(k) and ∆w1(k) are given
by
∆s1(k) = p
s
51(k)s1(k)
∆w1(k) = p
w
51(k)w1(k)
Given ps21(k) = p
w
21(k) for k ≥ K+1, set A also constructed
the following relationship
s1(k)− pi1(k)w1(k) = 0 (43)
for k = K + 1,K + 2, . . . ,M where pi1(k) =
ps21(k)s1(k)/p
w
21(k)w1(k) is known to set A since both
ps21(k)s1(k) and p
w
21(k)w1(k) belong to IA.
The total number of linear equations (41), (42), and
(43) is 3M − 2K + 1, and in these equations there
are 4M − 2K + 3 variables unknown to set A,
i.e., s1(0), . . . , s1(M + 1),∆s1(0), . . . ,∆s1(M), w1(K +
2), . . . , w1(M +1),∆w1(K +1), . . . ,∆w1(M). So there are
infinitely many solutions since the number of equations is less
than the number of unknown variables. In order to uniquely
determine the value of x01, we used the least-squares solution
to estimate x01. In each experiment, set A estimated x01 for
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Fig. 3. Estimation of x0
1
by the set of honest-but-curious nodes 2, 3, and 4.
In each experiment, the actual value of x0
1
is represented by the star, and the
estimated values of x0
1
are represented by the x-marks.
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Fig. 4. The evolution of xi(k) under the approach proposed in [12].
1000 times, with recorded estimation results shown in Fig. 3.
It can be seen that set A cannot get a good estimate of x01.
We also compared our Algorithm 1 with existing
data-obfuscation based approaches, more specifically, the
differential-privacy based approach in [12], the finite-noise-
sequence approach in [19], and the decaying-noise approach
in [21]. Under the same network setup as in the previous
simulations, we set the initial values to {10, 15, 20, 25, 30},
respectively, with the average value given by 20. The weight
matrixW was adopted from [12], i.e., the ij-th entry was set
to wij = 1/(|N outj |+ 1) for i ∈ N outj ∪ {j} and wij = 0 for
i /∈ N outj ∪ {j}. Since the graph is directed and imbalanced,
and does not satisfy the undirected or balanced assumption
in [12], [19], [21], the approaches in [12], [19], [21] failed
to achieve average consensus, as confirmed by the numerical
simulation results in Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6, respectively.
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Fig. 5. The evolution of xi(k) under the approach proposed in [19].
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Fig. 6. The evolution of xi(k) under the approach proposed in [21].
B. Hardware Experiments
To confirm the efficiency of our proposed Algorithm 2
in real-world embedded systems, we also implemented our
algorithm on five Raspberry Pi boards with 64-bit ARMv8
CPU and 1 GB RAM. In the hardware implementation, the
communication was conducted through Wi-Fi based on the
“sys/socket.h” C library. Paillier encryption/decryption was
realized using the “libpaillier-0.8” library from [40]. Since
in the implementation, it was impossible to start all nodes
simultaneously, a counter was introduced on each node which
helped nodes to stay on the same pace. For 256-bit encryption
key, the size of the actual packet was 136 bytes, which in-
cluded all necessary headers and stuffing bytes. The interaction
graph is still Fig. 1. The initial values of the five nodes were
set to {10, 15, 20, 25, 30}, which have an average value of 20.
K and ε were set to 1 and 0.01, respectively. The coupling
weights psij(k) for k ≤ K were chosen from (−10, 10). For
each encryption, the average processing latency was 12.15 ms,
which is acceptable for most real-time control systems. The
implementation result is given in Fig. 7, which shows that for
each node i, the estimate pii converged to the exact average
value α = 20.
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Fig. 7. The evolution of each estimate pii(k) in the hardware implementation
on five Raspberry Pi boards.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a privacy-preserving average consensus ap-
proach for directed graphs. Different from existing differential-
privacy based approaches which inject noise to exchanged
states and thus compromise accuracy, we leverage the in-
herent robustness of consensus dynamics to embed privacy
in random coupling weights, which guarantees consensus to
the exact value. Furthermore, the approach can be combined
with encryption to protect against eavesdroppers which fail
all correlated-noise based privacy-preserving average consen-
sus approaches. Experimental results on embedded micro-
controllers confirm that the computational burden is manage-
able on resource-restricted systems.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Given w(0) = 1 and Pw(k) = I for
k = 0, 1, . . . ,K , it is easy to obtain wi(k) = 1 for k ≤ K+1
from (5).
Since w(K + 1) = 1 holds, from (8) we have
w(K + l + 1) = Φw(K + l : K + 1)1 (44)
for l ≥ 1. Define δ(l) as
δ(l) , min
1≤i≤N
wi(K + l + 1)
= min
1≤i≤N
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)1]i
(45)
for l ≥ 1. To prove wi(k) ≥ εN for k ≥ K + 2, i.e., wi(K +
l + 1) ≥ εN for l ≥ 1, it suffices to prove δ(l) ≥ εN for
l ≥ 1. Next, we divide the proof into two parts: 1 ≤ l ≤ N
and l ≥ N + 1.
Part 1: δ(l) ≥ εN for 1 ≤ l ≤ N . It is easy to verify that
the following relationship exists
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)]ii = [Pw(K + l) · · ·Pw(K + 1)]ii
≥[Pw(K + l)]ii [Pw(K + l − 1) · · ·Pw(K + 1)]ii
≥ε [Φw(K + l − 1 : K + 1)]ii
Given [Φw(K +1 : K + 1)]ii = [Pw(K + 1)]ii ≥ ε, we have
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)]ii ≥ εl. So it follows naturally that
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)1]i ≥ [Φw(K + l : K + 1)]ii ≥ εl ≥ εN
holds for i = 1, . . . , N and 1 ≤ l ≤ N , meaning that δ(l) ≥
εN holds for 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
Part 2: δ(l) ≥ εN for l ≥ N + 1. Given l ≥ N + 1 and
Φw(K+l : K+l−N+1) = Pw(K+l) · · ·Pw(K+l−N+1),
we have the following relationship according to (8)
w(K+ l+1) = Φw(K+ l : K+ l−N+1)w(K+ l−N+1)
Letting w(K+ l−N+1) be a standard basis vector ej where
the j-th entry of ej is 1 and all other entries are 0, we have
wi(K + l + 1) = [Φw(K + l : K + l −N + 1)]ij
Next, we prove
[Φw(K + l : K + l −N + 1)]ij ≥ εN
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , which is equivalent to wi(K + l+1) ≥ εN
under w(K + l −N + 1) = ej .
If i = j holds, given w(k + 1) = Pw(k)w(k) and
[Pw(k)]ii ≥ ε for k ≥ K + 1, we have wi(k + 1) ≥ εwi(k).
Using the fact wi(K + l−N + 1) = 1, one can easily verify
wi(K+l+1) ≥ εN , implying [Φw(K+l : K+l−N+1)]ii ≥
εN for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
If i 6= j holds, since the graph G is strongly connected, there
must exist a path from node j to node i. Denote the path as
v1  v2  · · ·  vr where v1 = j, vr = i, and r ≤ N . Since
[Pw(K + l−N + k)]vk+1vk ≥ ε holds for 1 ≤ k ≤ r− 1, we
have
wvk+1(K + l −N + k + 1) ≥ εwvk(K + l −N + k)
Given wv1 (K + l −N + 1) = wj(K + l −N + 1) = 1,
wvr (K + l −N + r) = wi(K + l−N + r) ≥ εr−1
holds. Further taking into account the facts [Pw(k)]ii ≥ ε for
k ≥ K + 1, we have
wi(K+l+1) ≥ εN−r+1wi(K+l−N+r) ≥ εN−r+1εr−1 = εN
which implies
[Φw(K + l : K + l −N + 1)]ij ≥ εN
for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N .
Therefore, we have [Φw(K+ l : K+ l−N+1)]ij ≥ εN for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Since l ≥ N + 1 holds and Pw(k) is column
stochastic,
Φw(K + l −N : K + 1) = Pw(K + l −N) · · ·Pw(K + 1)
is also column stochastic. Further taking into account the fact
Φw(K + l : K + 1)
=Φw(K + l : K + l −N + 1)Φw(K + l −N : K + 1)
leads to
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)]ij ≥ εN
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . So it can be easily verified that
[Φw(K + l : K + 1)1]i ≥ NεN ≥ εN
holds for i = 1, . . . , N , meaning that δ(l) ≥ εN holds for
l ≥ N + 1.
Therefore, δ(l) ≥ εN holds for l ≥ 1, which implies wi(K+
l + 1) ≥ εN for l ≥ 1. In conclusion, we have wi(k) = 1 for
k ≤ K + 1 and wi(k) ≥ εN for k ≥ K + 2. 
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